Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

Tammy Bluemel v. State of Utah : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Benjamin A. Hamilton; Skordas, Caston, Hamilton and Hyde; Attorneys for Appellant.
Brett J. Delporto; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Attorney
for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Bluemel v. State of Utah, No. 20050208 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5640

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TAMMY BLUEMEL,

:

Appellant,

:

v.

: Appellate Court Case No. 2005-0208

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Appellee.

:

REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Appeal from a Memorandum Decision, granting Appellee's Motion to
dismiss Appellant's petition for Post-conviction Relief, in the Fourth Judicial
District, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable James R. Taylor
presiding. Appellant is currently incarcerated at the Utah State Prison.
Benjamin A. Hamilton (#6238)
SKORDAS, CASTON, HAMILTON & HYDE
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1104, Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone(801) 531-7444
Attorneys for Appellant
Brett J. Delporto (#6862)
Assistant Attorney General
Mark L.Shurtleff (#4666)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854

Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Attorney for Appellee

FILED
UTAH

APPELLATE COURTS

NOV P k 2005

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TAMMY BLUEMEL,
Appellant,

:
:

v.

: Appellate Court Case No. 2005-0208

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Appellee.

:

REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Appeal from a Memorandum Decision, granting Appellee's Motion to
dismiss Appellant's petition for Post-conviction Relief, in the Fourth Judicial
District, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable James R. Taylor
presiding. Appellant is currently incarcerated at the Utah State Prison.

Benjamin A. Hamilton (#6238)
SKORDAS, CASTON, HAMILTON & HYDE
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1104, Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone (801) 531-7444
Attorneys for Appellant
Brett J. Delporto (#6862)
Assistant Attorney General
Mark L. Shurtleff (#4666)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Attorney for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT

5

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AS UMTIMELY

5

A. The statutory limitations period is inapplicable to the present case, thus
Appellant's petition should not have been dismissed as time barred

5

B. Appellant's claim meets the statutory "interests of justice" exception

7

II. Appellant is entitled to relief based on the merits of her petition
Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel

11
11

Appellant's plea was involuntary and unknowing - as such the untimely filing
of her petition should be excused and post-conviction relief granted
CONCLUSION

14
19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Statutes
U.C.A. §77-15-2

16

U.C.A. §78-35a-102

6

U.C.A. §78-35a-107(l)

6

U.C.A. §78-35a-107(3)

6

U.C.A. §78-35a-107(c)

7

Utah Code Ann. §75-35a-104

15

Utah Code Ann. §77-15-1 (West 2004

16

Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-104

6

Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-107(3)

6

Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-107(a)-(b)

7

Rules
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)

15

Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a)

12

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3-1.4

12

State Cases
Adams at ^ 23

9

Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62 (September 23, 2005)

6

Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39,42-43 (Utah 1981)

12

Broeckel v. State, 900 P.2d 1205,1208 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)

13

Carter v. Galetka, 2001 Ut 96, f 15,44 P.3d 626
Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998)

5
5

Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313-14

18

Hendersonv. State, 643 S.W. 2d 107,108-09(Ark. 1982)

12

Jackson v. Friel, 2004 UT App 155

5

Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 253-54 (Utah 1998)

5

Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998)

4

Julian, 966 P.2d at 259

9

Mancilv. State, 682 So.2d501, 502 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996)

11

Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57, 88 P.3d 353

11

Moench, 2004 UT App at f21

11

Salazar v. Warden, Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988 (Utah 1993)
State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42,123, 5 P.2d 642
State v. Adams, 2005 UT 62 at \ 24

15
7
10

State v. Adams, 2005 UT 62, If 15 (Utah 2005)

5

State v. Adams, 955 P.2d 781, 788 (Utah App. 1998)

7

State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, f 48, 63 P.3d 731

15

State v. Corwell, 2005 UT28,lf 11

14

State v. G/Www, 740P.2d 1309,1312 (Utah 1987)

15

State v. i/araeH, 2002 UT 114, If 21 n. 2, 61 P.3d 1062 (Utah 2002)

13

State v. Holland, 921 P.2d430,433 (Utah 1996)

15

State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981)

12

State v. Lithander, 2000 UT 76,f9,12 P.3d 92 (Utah 2000)

13

State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203,204 (Utah 1976)

10

State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28,111, 996 P.2d 1065

14

State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 777 (UtahCt App. 1990)

17

State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 670-71 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

14

State v. Wicker, 20P.2d 1007 (Wash.App. 2001)

12

Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277,282 (Utah 1995)

11

U.C.A. §78-35a-107(l)

5

v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, 1 11, 983 P.2d 556

14

Federal Cases
Godinex v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993)

16

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993)

15

McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459,466, 89 S.Ct. 1166,1170,22 L.Ed.2d 418
(1969)

14

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, n.14, 90 S.Ct. 1441,1449 n.14, L.Ed.2d 763
(1970)

10

Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 89 S.Ct. 1715, 23 L.Ed.2d 340 (1969

11

Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029, L.Ed.2d 985 (2000)

13

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687,104 S.Ct. 2052, L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)

10

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I: The trial court improperly dismissed the petition for post conviction relief as
untimely, as the petitioner has demonstrated that such relief is warranted under the
"interests of justice" statutory exception. Petitioner's claims are meritorious and should
be considered and granted.
Point II: Petitioner's request for post conviction relief should have been granted on the
basis that her constitutional rights were violated. The Appellant received ineffective
assistance of counsel, and the trial court erred in accepting her plea, which was
involuntarily and unknowing.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AS UNTIMELY
A. The statutory limitations period is inapplicable to the present case, thus
Appellant's petition should not have been dismissed as time barred.
The trial court erred in dismissing the appellant's petition for post-conviction
relief of grounds of timeliness. According to the Utah Supreme Court, "the mere passage
of time can never justify continued imprisonment of one who has been deprived of
fundamental rights, regardless of how difficult it may be for the State to reprosecute that
individual." Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998) (emphasis in original).
The Post Conviction Remedies Act provides for a defendant to petition for postconviction relief, such as a vacation or modification of an original conviction on grounds
that "the conviction was obtained . . . in violation of the United States Constitution ..
.[or] the Utah Constitution . . . [or] the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in

violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution^]" Utah Code Ann. §783 5a-104. The purpose of this act is to provide a "substantive legal remedy for any
person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has
exhausted all other legal remedies[.]" U.C.A. §78-35a-102. Review of a final conviction
is generally not subject to attack, except in unusual circumstances. Jackson v. Friel 2004
UT App 155 (citing Carter v. Galetka, 2001 Ut 96, f 15, 44 P.3d 626). A demonstration
of unusual circumstances may be made by showing that "there was an obvious injustice
or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right." Id.
The statute governing post conviction relief provides that such a petition must be
filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued. U.C.A. §78-35a-107(l).
However, this same statute specifically provides that "[i]f the court finds that the interests
of justice so require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the time
limitations. U.C.A. §78-35a-107(3). The Utah Supreme Court has recently clarified the
meaning of "interests of justice" within the context of this act, applying its conclusion in
similar cases that "trial courts must always consider the 'interests of justice' exception ..
when a petitioner raises meritorious claims." State v. Adams, 2005 UT 62, f 15 (Utah
2005) (citing Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998) and its application of "interests
of justice" exception articulated in Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 253-54 (Utah 1998)).
(internal quotations omitted).
The "interests of justice" exception in Utah Code Ann. §78-3 5a-107(3) allows for
a trial court to grant post-conviction relief beyond the one-year statute of limitations in
cases where it is justified, as in the present case. The trial court's dismissal of

Appellant's petition on grounds of timeliness was premature, as the facts in this case
bring it within the specified exception.
B. Appellant's claim meets the statutory "interests of justice" exception.
The Appellant concedes that her petition was filed beyond the one-year statute of
limitations period provided in Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-107(a)-(b). However, rather than
giving rise to a mandatory dismissal of a petition, an untimely request under this statute
requires the trial court to analyze whether the petition should still be heard and granted
under the statutory exception to the limitations period proscribed in U.C.A. §78-35a107(c). The instant petition falls squarely within the "interests of justice" grounds,
which specifically justifies the acceptance of a petition filed beyond the one-year period.
Petitioner has alleged in detail both constitutional violations and the ineffective
assistance of counsel as grounds for justifying excusing the time limitation in her initial
brief, and will address the challenges proffered by the State at this time. The State relies
upon a recent opinion issued by the Utah Supreme Court, Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62
(September 23, 2005), in support of the trial court's dismissal of the petition. The state
cites the following excerpt of the opinion as dispositive: "[I]n determining whether the
"interests of justice" exception applies, [a] court must consider whether (1) the petition
raises potentially meritorious claims and (2) the reason for the untimely filing." Adams v.
State, 2005 UT 621fl6. R.Aplt. Br. at 11. (emphasis added).
In the same paragraph and in the sentence immediately following that cited above
by the State in support of their contention, the supreme court states:
"We do not establish a hard and fast rule that a petitioner must be able to
demonstrate both that his claim is meritorious and that he was justified in raising
it late; rather, we expect that the district court will give appropriate weight to each

of those factors according to the circumstances of a particular case." Adams at
116.
In Adams, the petitioner was convicted of forcible sexual abuse; both this Court
and the Utah Supreme Court then affirmed this conviction on direct appeal. See State v.
Adams, 2000 UT 42, f23, 5 P.2d 642 and State v. Adams, 955 P.2d 781, 788 (Utah App.
1998). The statute of limitations for post conviction relief expired for Adams on August
3, 2001. Id. at fl2. Adams filed his petition nearly two years after the limitations period
had expired, on May 14, 2003, on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel - the trial
court granted the state's motion to dismiss the petition on grounds of timeliness. Id. at | 4 .
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that Adams' petition should not have
been dismissed as it presented a potentially meritorious claim, and he had good reason for
filing beyond the statute of limitations. Id. at f27. The court found that Adams' claim
that his prior attorneys were ineffective for a failing to raise voluntary intoxication as a
defense was potentially meritorious due to the specific intent requirement for the offense
of forcible sexual abuse. Id. at ^[22 and n.3. In addition, the court found that Adams'
reason for untimely filing was justified, as he wasn't aware of the possibility of a
voluntary intoxication defense until after locating counsel1. Id. at f 23.
The Adams decision is substantially analogous to and controlling in the present
case. Under the standard established by Adams, the Appellant meets the "interests of
justice" exception. The Appellant has proffered two potentially meritorious claims, each
of which would independently warrant relief under the statute. First, petitioner has
presented and supported by affidavit the fact that she was under the influence of multiple
prescription medications at the time of her plea, which substantially impacted her
1

Adams discharged his trial counsel and hired new counsel prior to pursuing his direct appeals, and then
sought the services of a third attorney who finally brought the intoxication defense to his attention.

cognitive functioning to a heightened degree, and that the plea was thereby offered
unknowingly and involuntarily. In addition, petitioner asserts a meritorious ineffective
assistance of counsel claim - each of these claims will be treated in further detail below.
In Adams, the failure of both trial counsel and counsel for the direct appeals to
raise a possible affirmative defense was viewed as a potentially meritorious claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel; here, after being informed by the Appellant of her
desire to appeal, Ms. BluemePs counsel not only did not file the notice to appeal, but he
misrepresented the time for a required appeal, misrepresented that the appeal was being
taken care of, and mismanaged the submission of the plea by being unaware of his
client's condition and intake of prescription medication.
With respect to the reason for the untimely petition, in Adams, the court found
that the unawareness of a possible defense justified filing nearly two years beyond the
deadline. In the present case, the State gives the erroneous indication that the Appellant
filed her petition two years late. Rspndt. Br. at 13. This overstates the untimeliness of the
petition. The first year that transpired following her sentencing, the proscribed period for
a post-conviction relief petition, the Appellant understood that her trial counsel was
handling the appeal, as he had told her he was handling the appeal and that there was one
year in which to do so, she had no knowledge to the contrary. When the Appellant
realized she was no longer receiving assistance with her appeal, the one-year statue of
limitations had already expired. Appellant then sought and ultimately secured new
counsel, all the while incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. With the expected degree of
difficulty, appellant was ultimately able to secure counsel, who then assessed the case,
researched the applicable law and filed the petition within one year and seven days of the

limitations period, a reasonable time period under the circumstances, and nearly half that
of the appellant in Adams.
Appellant is similarly situated to Adams, in that neither understood the legal
significance of their situations. In analyzing these circumstances, the Utah Supreme
Court relied upon the language of Justice Zimmerman offered in Julian, that "it is nearly
impossible for even the most conscientious prisoner to discover possibly valid legal
claims of error and pursue them completely." Julian, 966 P.2d at 259. (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring). Justice Zimmerman further commented that "the legal services provided to
assist the prisoners are grossly inadequate. Under such circumstances, it is a cruel joke to
presume as the legislature has that virtually all prisoners are abusing the system when
they file . . . petitions more than a year after their conviction." Id. The Adams court
"decline[d] to put the burden on individuals untrained in the law to discover the errors of
those whose assistance they were constitutionally guaranteed." Adams at f 23. It is
clearly unjust to punish the Appellant for the misrepresentations of her prior counsel, and
for the difficulty she had in procuring new counsel from the state prison. Just as the
supreme court found in Adams, this court should find that the Appellant's claims meet the
"interests of justice" exception.
The trial court erred in dismissing the Appellant's petition as time-barred, as the
petition falls squarely within the "interests of justice" exception provided by statute.
Relief should be granted because the Appellant presented potentially meritorious claims
of (1) ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) involuntary and unknowing pleas; and
presented a reasonable, acceptable and justified reason for the delay in her petition which
has recently been recognized by the supreme court of this state.

II. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF BASED ON THE MERITS
OF HER PETITION,
A. Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to have assistance of counsel in
defending all claims asserted against them in a court of law, a guarantee provided for by
both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Utah State
Constitution. This fundamental right has been appropriately termed "the right to effective
assistance of counsel" by the Supreme Court. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
n.14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n.14, L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). The Utah Supreme Court has
interpreted this guarantee as entitling a defendant to "assistance of a competent member
of the Bar, who shows a willingness to identify himself with the interests of the accused
and present such defenses as are available under the law and consistent with the ethics of
the profession." State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976).
The right to effective counsel is an essential safeguard, and the courts in this state
have recognized that there is no replacement for a competent and dedicated advocate. See
State v. Adams, 2005 UT 62 at f 24 (noting the importance of competent counsel, and
stating that even though the client is the ultimate decision maker, counsel is required to
"at least apprise the client of the options available and give advice based on research,
experience, and sound judgment."). Constitutional standards specify that counsel is
ineffective if their "performance both falls below an objective standard of reasonableness
and prejudices the client." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, in order to establish that counsel was ineffective, it must be
shown that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,"

a standard generally determined by examining the prevailing professional norms.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. In addition, the defendant must show that they were
prejudiced by the deficient performance of their counsel." Id. at 689.
In order to demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below reasonable
standards, a defendant must identify "specific acts or omissions demonstrating that
counsel's representation failed to meet an objective standard of reasonableness." Moench
v. State, 2004 UT App 57, 88 P.3d 353 (citing Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282
(Utah 1995)). Counsel's tactical decisions are generally granted wide latitude, and only
questioned if unreasonable. See Moench, 2004 UT App at 121. However, lawyers are
bound to abide by a client's decisions regarding the objectives of the representation. See
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a). In addition to identifying an attorney's role
and the scope of representation, the Utah Rules of Professional conduct also require an
attorney to "act with reasonable diligence and promptness," to "keep their clients
reasonably informed about the status of a matter" and to "explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to enable the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation." See Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3-1.4.
While the Rules of Professional conduct speak generally about the duties owed to
clients, numerous courts have spoken regarding the specific issue presented in this case,
whether disregarding instructions to appeal qualifies as ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Supreme Court has held that "a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the
defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable."
Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 89 S.Ct. 1715, 23 L.Ed.2d 340 (1969); Mancil
v. State, 682 So.2d 501, 502 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996) (holding that "[fjailure to timely appeal

to this court is a classic example of ineffective assistance of counsel."); Henderson v.
State, 643 S.W. 2d 107, 108-09 (Ark. 1982) (holding that "the failure of counsel to
perfect an appeal in a criminal case where the defendant desires an appeal amounts to a
denial of the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel."); State v. Wicker, 20
P.2d 1007 (Wash.App. 2001) ("it is well-recognized that an attorney's failure to file a
requested notice of appeal is 'professionally unreasonable.'").
Where a defendant has been denied the right to appeal, they have been denied a
constitutional right warranting post-conviction relief. See Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39,
42-43 (Utah 1981). Utah courts have held that if "within the statutory period for appeal,
[the] defendant requested counsel to take an appeal and counsel gave defendant reason to
believe that he would but then failed to do so, defendant was denied a constitutional right.
See State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981). In Johnson, because the defendant
was effectively denied his constitutional right to appeal, post conviction relief was
deemed the appropriate remedy. Id.
Here, the Appellant requested her counsel to file an appeal, and was repeatedly
assured that trial counsel had done so, and was 'handling it.' (Civil R. 113). Trial counsel
even visited Appellant in prison where she again expressed her desire to appeal, and was
yet again reassured by counsel that it was being taken care of. Id. By the time Appellant
discovered that she had been mislead, and that trial counsel hadn't filed her appeal, not
only had the time for an appeal lapsed, but the time period for filing a petition seeking
post-conviction relief had passed as well. The legal counsel provided to the Appellant
following her sentencing was not only clearly ineffective, it was essentially non-existent.
Trial counsel blatantly ignored Appellant's specific requests, and mislead her with

respect to actions presumably taken and misstated the applicable law. {See Aplt. Br. at
40-46 for specific examples of counsel's inefficiency and failure to serve Appellant's
objectives).
In addition to falling below standards of professional reasonableness, counsel's
deficient performance significantly prejudiced the Appellant. Prejudice can be presumed
to exist when counsel fails to file an appeal after being requested to do so, and need not
be demonstrated by the defendant. See Broeckel v. State, 900 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1995).
Here, prejudice can be shown by the failure to file a timely notice of appeal. Roe
v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029, L.Ed.2d 985 (2000). Appellant can
satisfy both elements as required under Strickland, on this basis alone. In addition to this
failure, Appellant has presented additional prejudices in the form of failure to file
additional motions, as well as failure to assess her ability to enter into a knowing and
voluntary plea which further exacerbate the ineffective assistance of counsel received by
the Appellant. (See Aplt. Br. at 44-46 for further details regarding counsel's deficiencies).
B. Appellant's plea was involuntary and unknowing - as such the untimely
tiling of her petition should be excused and post-conviction relief granted.
A defendant appropriately petitions for post-conviction relief by challenging a
conviction on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of the United States or Utah

2

The State contends that Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to
pursue an appeal was not preserved and is thus barred. (Rspndt. Br. at 22). The appropriate time to raise
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is upon appeal. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, f 21 n. 2, 61
P.3d 1062 (Utah 2002) (recognizing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as one of three instances
under Utah law where an appellate court may address an issue for thefirsttime on appeal). In fact,
according to the Utah Supreme Court, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel "should be raised on
appeal if (1) the record is adequate to permit decision of the issue and (2) defendant is represented by
counsel other than trial counsel. State v. Lithander, 2000 UT 76, \ 9, 12 P.3d 92 (Utah 2000). Appellant's
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were thus appropriately raised.

Constitutions. Utah Code Ann. §75-35a-104. The Constitution requires that any guilty
plea be entered both voluntarily and knowingly. State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,111,
983 P.2d 556; State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 670-71 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). When a plea
is not voluntarily and knowingly entered, the defendant's due process rights have been
violated, and the plea is accordingly deemed unconstitutional. Id; McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1170, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969).
Prior to accepting a guilty plea from a defendant, a court must determine the
following: that the plea was voluntary, the defendant is aware of the right to the
presumption of innocence, the right against self-incrimination, the right to a speedy
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; that the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that if a trial occurred the
prosecution would have the burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the plea is an admission of all those elements, that there is a factual basis for the plea,
that the defendant knows the minimum and maximum possible sentences, the details of
the plea agreement, that the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing a
motion to withdraw the plea, and that the defendant knows the right of appeal is limited.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). The court must be personally satisfied that each of the above
elements is satisfied. Rule 11 must be strictly complied with, and the trial court has the
burden to "personally establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or
her constitutional rights." State v. Cornell, 2005 UT 28,111. See also State v. Ostler,
2000 UT App 28,111, 996 P.2d 1065 (stating that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel

is embodied in Rule 11); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1312 (Utah
1987)(requirements in Rule 11 protect a defendant's right to due process).
Appellant identified with specificity in her initial brief that Rule 11 was not
strictly complied with in the present case. See Aplt. Br. at 23-24. In addition to the
court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 11, Appellant has also shown that her plea
was in fact not knowing or voluntary. Salazar v. Warden, Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d
988 (Utah 1993). Under Utah law, for a plea to be knowing and voluntary, the defendant
must be mentally competent. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, If 48, 63 P.3d 731. "No
person who is incompetent to proceed shall be tried for a public offense." Utah Code
Ann. §77-15-1 (West 2004). U.C.A. §77-15-2 defines a defendant's incompetence to
proceed as an "inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings
against him or of the punishment specified for the offense charged; or . . . his inability to
consult with counsel and to participate in the proceedings against him with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding." Utah Code Ann. §77-15-2 (West 2004). To determine
whether a defendant is competent to plead guilty, a trial court must consider whether the
defendant has the ability to "consult with his [or her] lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him [or her]." State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996)
(internal citations and quotations omitted)(citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396
(1993)).
The State contends that there was nothing before the trial court here to raise a
substantial question about the Appellant's competence to plead guilty. Rspndt. Br. at 16.
This perceived absence of evidence of the Appellant's incompetence is directly related to

the trial court's failure to strictly adhere to Rule 11. Had the trial court attempted to
"personally establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived her
constitutional rights," it would have been clear that the Appellant lacked competence to
enter a voluntary and knowing plea. See Corwell, 2005 UT 28 at \ 11.
The state next alleges that the petitioner's affidavits are ambiguous with respect to
the drugs she had actually taken immediately prior to her change-of-plea hearing, and the
impairment they could have caused. Rspndt. Br. at 17. The Supreme Court has noted that
a defendant's competency to enter a valid plea can be detrimentally affected by
medications, which can cause a defendant to be unable to enter a knowing and voluntary
plea. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396 (1993).
Both the affidavit of the Appellant, and that of Dr. Rollins make specific
references to the dosages and frequency with which each medication listed by the
Appellant was taken at the time her plea was offered. (Bluemel Aff. at % 5; Rollins Aff.
at f 6). Dr. Rollins' took this dosage and frequency into consideration when making the
assertion that "[t]he effect of these drugs, if taken together, on a person of Ms. Bluemel's
stature would likely have impaired her cognitive function to a heightened degree."
(Rollins Aff. at 111). Dr. Rollins identified five drugs specifically as affecting cognitive
functioning before making his determination. (Rollins Aff. at 16). Neurontin, Effexor,
Xanax, Trazadone, and Soma were all identified as drugs with an impact on cognitive
functioning. Id. Dr. Rollins was aware of dosage amounts, and noted that the Ms.
Bluemel was taking a daily dose of Xanax and Trazadone, two daily doses of Effexor,
three daily doses of Neurontin, and four daily doses of Soma. (Rollins Aff. at f 6). The
State's contention that any impact of these drugs may have worn off at the time of the

hearing is unsubstantiated; conversely, Dr. Rollins as a Professor of Pharmacology and
Toxicology was aware of Ms. BluemePs daily medication regimen, and possesses the
medical expertise to render a conclusion which takes into consideration any lingering side
effects and influence the specified amount of the respective medications would have on
an individual of the Appellant's stature. The argument concerning Ibuprofen and
Macrodantin as mere 'responses to maladies' is irrelevant, as these two drugs are not
listed among those affecting cognitive functioning.
The State refers to the trial court's lack of commentary with respect to
Appellant's responses to questions and her general demeanor as evidence that she was
competent. (Rspndt. Br. at 18). This argument is flawed, as the trial court's exchanges
and interaction with the Appellant were limited to a few cursory "yes" and "no"
responses to routine questions. In fact, the Appellant appeared distracted throughout the
proceeding, and not focused on the judge as would be expected under the circumstances.
(Civil R. 146). The record reflects little interaction that would lead to a reliable
determination that Appellant was competent, a fact that could have been determined with
strict adherence to Rule 11, or with simple inquiry beyond the routine "yes" and "no"
questions upon which the trial court based its determination of competency.
The State again argues that the Appellant's written Plea Statement is evidence of
her competence. This notion is misguided and fundamentally flawed. A defendant
incapable of entering a voluntary and knowing plea is not deemed competent by virtue of
signing a statement to that effect. A signed statement is simply insufficient to establish
Appellant's competence. State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that an affidavit alone is insufficient to ensure that the defendant's constitutional

rights are protected); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313-14 (same; after reviewing affidavit, a
court should then question the defendant about it and determine whether the requirements
are met). The Appellant's signed statement directly contradicts the subsequent affidavit
which establishes that Appellant was under the influence of a number of medications
which impacted her competence. A simple inquiry by the court on the record regarding
the signed statement could have clarified the Appellant's condition and competency.
However, the trial court accepted the statement at face value, and overlooked the
requirements of Rule 11, thereby failing to sufficiently establish the competency of the
Appellant, and her ability to offer a knowing and voluntary plea. Based upon the
foregoing, this court should find that the plea offered by the Appellant was involuntary
and unknowing, and as a result the trial court erred in accepting it.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the arguments set forth above, the Appellant respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the trial courts dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.
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